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Law School Professors File Amicus Briefs in Support of Commissioner’s Position in Altera

by Roger J. Jones | Aug 3, 2016 | Appellate Courts, IRS Guidance, Transfer Pricing Resource, Uncategorized

Two groups of law school professors have filed amicus briefs with the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in support of the government’s position in Altera Corp. v. Commissioner, Dkt Nos. 16-70496, 16-70497. Read more on the appeal of Altera here and the US Supreme Court’s opinion addressing interplay between the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) procedural compliance and Chevron deference here. Each group argues that Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7 represents a valid exercise of the Commissioner’s authority to issue regulations under Internal Revenue Code (Code) Section 482 and that the US Tax Court (Tax Court) erred in finding the regulation to be invalid under section 706 of the APA.

One group of six professors (Harvey Group) first notes its agreement with the arguments advanced by the government in its opening brief. In particular, the Harvey Group concurs with the argument that “coordinating amendments promulgated with Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(d)(2) vitiate the Tax Court’s analysis in Xilinx that the cost-sharing regulation conflicts with the arm’s-length standard.” It then goes on to note its agreement with the government’s argument that “the ‘commensurate with the income’ standard … contemplates a purely internal approach to allocating income from intangibles to related parties.”

Having thus supported the government’s commensurate-with income-based arguments, the Harvey Group argues that the regulation in question is, in any event, consistent with the general arm’s-length standard of Code Section 482. It does so based principally on the proposition that “[s]tock-based compensation costs are real costs, and no profit-maximizing economic actor would ignore them.” However, that said, “there are material differences between controlled and uncontrolled parties’ attitudes, motivations and behaviors regarding stock-based compensation.” Thus, according to the Harvey Group, the Tax Court erred when it concluded that “Treasury necessarily decided an empirical question when it concluded that the final rule was consistent with the arm’s-length standard,” because “[n]o empirical finding that uncontrolled parties do, or might, share stock-based compensation costs is required to support Treasury’s regulation.” Accordingly, the Tax Court’s reliance on State Farm and the cases following it was a “key misstep” by the Tax Court.

The Harvey Group also proposes that, should the Ninth Circuit find that the term “arm’s length standard” or the meaning of the “coordinating regulations” is ambiguous, the government’s interpretation embodied in Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7 should be afforded Auer deference. Read more on deference principles in tax cases and the unique challenges of Auer deference. Auer deference is a special level of deference that can apply when an agency interprets its own regulations, although there are several limitations on its use. Finally, if the Ninth Circuit decides that the regulations “have an infirmity,” the Harvey Group argues that “[t]he best remedy is to remand to Treasury for further consideration.”

A second group of nineteen professors (Alstott Group) similarly agrees with the government’s arguments to the Ninth Circuit. The Alstott Group argues that the 1986 addition of the “commensurate with income” standard [...]

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Supreme Court Issues Opinion Addressing Interplay between APA Procedural Compliance and Chevron Difference

by Roger J. Jones | Jul 6, 2016 | Appellate Courts, Court Procedure Matters, Uncategorized

In Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, Sup. Ct. No. 15-415 (June 20, 2016), the Supreme Court of the United States invalidated a regulation issued by the US Department of Labor (DOL) under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). In doing so, it affirmed long-standing precedent regarding the procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and addressed the effect of noncompliance with those requirements on the deference, if any, courts must afford agency pronouncements. Thus, even though it is not a tax case, it is likely to have an effect on cases in which taxpayers argue that a treasury regulation is invalid.

The Court’s holding here is based upon an agency’s unexplained change in a long-standing position. The FLSA requires employers to pay overtime compensation to covered employees who work more than 40 hours in a given week. It exempts from this requirement “any salesman, partman, or mechanic primarily engaged in selling or servicing automobiles” at a covered dealership. From 1978 to 2011, the DOL’s position was that such employees were exempt from the overtime-pay rule. This position was set forth in a number of published pronouncements, including proposed regulations in 2008. However, when the regulations were finalized in 2011, the DOL took the opposite position. In a suit brought by a number of service advisors against a dealership for overtime pay, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit resolved the matter by giving Chevron deference to the DOL’s interpretation embodied in the 2011 regulations, holding for the plaintiff employees. The Supreme Court majority denied Chevron deference and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for further proceedings on the meaning of the underlying statutory language. (more…)

Commissioner Files Opening Brief in Ninth Circuit Appeal of Altera

by Roger J. Jones | Jul 5, 2016 | Appellate Courts, Court Procedure Matters, Transfer Pricing Resource, Trial Courts, Uncategorized

In Altera Corp. v. Commissioner, 145 T.C. No. 3 (July 27, 2015), the Tax Court, in a unanimous reviewed opinion, held that regulations under Section 482 requiring parties to a qualified cost-sharing agreement (QCSA) to include stock-based compensation costs in the cost pool to comply with the arm’s-length standard were procedurally invalid because the US Deparment of Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) did not engage in the “reasoned decisionmaking” required by the Administrative Procedures Act and the cases interpreting it. For a discussion of the Tax Court’s Altera opinion, see our prior On the Subject. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner) appealed this holding to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals; he filed his opening brief on June 27, 2016.

According to the Commissioner, the Tax Court’s holding was based on several related errors: (1) the Tax Court mistakenly concluded that promulgation of the QCSA regs required the IRS to engage in an “essentially empirical” analysis; (2) this led the court to apply the wrong standard; (3) in its analysis, the court relied heavily on its holding in Xilinx, Inc. v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 37 (2005), that analysis of QCSAs must comport with the arm’s-length standard, meaning that a taxpayer can defend a QCSA by reference to comparable behavior between unrelated parties; and (4) the Tax Court failed to take into account that the finalization of the new QCSA regulations worked a “change in the legal landscape,” which should have altered the court’s analysis of the new regulations’ validity. Moreover, “the coordinating amendments [to the existing QCSA regulations] supersede [the Ninth Circuit’s] understanding of the arm’s-length standard as reflected in its own Xilinx opinion.” (more…)

Fifth Circuit Rejects Substantial Authority Defense to Penalties

by McDermott Will & Schulte | May 23, 2016 | Appellate Courts, Uncategorized

Prudent taxpayers analyze the relevant tax law while structuring and implementing transactions. The most obvious reason to do so is to ensure that the taxpayer’s proposed tax treatment is accepted by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Another reason is to ensure that, if such treatment is not accepted, the taxpayer will not be subjected to penalties.

The most common penalty asserted by the IRS in this regard is the accuracy-related penalty under IRC Section 6662. Among the many defenses to this penalty is the “substantial authority” defense, which looks at whether the weight of authorities supporting the return position is substantial in relation to the weight of authority supporting contrary treatment. The types of authorities that may be considered is broad, and includes the Internal Revenue Code, Treasury Regulations (proposed, temporary and final), other IRS published guidance, case law, tax treaties, legislative materials and certain IRS private guidance.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Chemtech Royalty Associates, L.P. provides some guidance on how courts view the substantial authority defense. In Chemtech, the taxpayer argued that it had substantial authority for its position based on two U.S. Tax Court cases, a published Tax Court opinion from 1949 and an unpublished memorandum opinion from 1990. The Fifth Circuit found that both cases, even if not materially distinguishable, were not substantial authority because a 1989 Fifth Circuit opinion was more apposite than the two Tax Court opinions. The court also noted that the published Tax Court opinion was “old” and the memorandum opinion was “unpublished.”

The Fifth Circuit’s opinion illustrates the difficulties that taxpayers may face when relying on the substantial authority defense. Although the applicable Treasury Regulations on the substantial authority defense do not distinguish between published and unpublished cases or the age of the authorities, the court’s approach indicates that these are relevant factors to consider. Taxpayers that intend to rely on the substantial authority defense should review the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Chemtech, as well as the applicable authority in their relevant circuit.

Auer Deference Debate Remains Unresolved

by McDermott Will & Schulte | May 20, 2016 | Appellate Courts, Trial Courts, Uncategorized

As we previously discussed, the issue of deference is a hot topic in the tax arena. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court of the United States recently passed on the opportunity to address the continuing validity of what is commonly known as Auer deference. This level of deference sometimes applies when an agency interprets its own regulations.

In United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Bryana Bible, S.Ct. No. 15-861, the Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari, leaving in place an opinion by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that deferred to the Department of Education’s interpretation in an amicus brief of the regulatory scheme that it enforces. In a scathing dissent from the denial of certiorari, Justice Thomas stated that the Auer doctrine “is on its last gasp” and that the Court should have taken the opportunity to reconsider and re-evaluate the doctrine. The Supreme Court’s rules require that at least four Justice must vote to accept a case. Although Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito have recently acknowledged that the doctrine should be reconsidered, the other vocal member in favor or reconsideration was the recently deceased Justice Scalia. It remains to be seen whether another current Justice will join these three Justices in the future to vote to revisit the issue.

BREAKING NEWS: Sales Tax Battle Breaks Out in South Dakota; Quill’s Last Stand?

by McDermott Will & Emery and Stephen P. Kranz | Apr 29, 2016 | Appellate Courts, Trial Courts, Uncategorized

This post is a follow-up to a previous post on McDermott’s Inside SALT blog from April 21, 2016.

Introduction

On March 22, 2016, South Dakota Governor Dennis Daugaard signed into law Senate Bill 106, which requires any person making more than $100,000 of South Dakota sales or more than 200 separate South Dakota sales transactions to collect and remit sales tax. The requirement applies to sales made on or after May 1, 2016.

The law clearly challenges the physical presence requirement under Quill, and that’s precisely what the legislature intended. The law seeks to force a challenge to the physical presence rule as soon as possible and speed that challenge through the courts.

As we discussed in our earlier post, the big question in response to the legislation was whether taxpayers should register to collect tax. For those who did not register, an injunction is now in place barring enforcement of the provisions until the litigation is resolved.

Last night and this morning two different declaratory judgment suits were filed in the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court of South Dakota regarding S.B. 106’s constitutionality, and more may follow. As has already been reported in a few outlets, one of these cases is American Catalog Mailers Association and NetChoice v. Gerlach (the ACMA Suit). In ACMA, the plaintiffs are trade associations representing catalog marketers and e-commerce retailers. The complaint can be found here.

What has yet to be widely reported is the other suit. This suit (the State Suit) was filed by South Dakota. Letters sent by South Dakota indicated that identified retailers needed to register by April 25. Because the new law does not become effective until May 1, many observers thought that South Dakota might wait to file until after that date. However, the suits have already been filed.

(more…)

IRS Commissioner Asks Congress to Overturn Loving

by Joshua M. Ellenberg and Kevin Spencer | Apr 22, 2016 | Appellate Courts, IRS Appeals, Uncategorized

Following a report by the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) that criticized the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for failing to protect taxpayer financial information from cybersecurity threats, IRS Commissioner John Koskinen has requested that US Congress give the IRS the power to license tax preparers. Prior efforts by the IRS to regulate paid tax preparers by forcing them to pass a competency exam and meet continuing education requirements had been struck down in a 2013 federal district court decision which was later affirmed unanimously by the US District Court for the District of Columbia in Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013 (DC Cir. 2014).

Having failed to achieve its goal in court, in 2014 the IRS turned to Capitol Hill to grant it the authority to enforce nationwide certification requirements on independent tax return preparers. Imposing competency requirements on tax return preparers is an idea supported not only by the IRS but also by National Taxpayer Advocate Nina E. Olsen and other tax policy leaders. Proponents have long argued that government regulations are needed to address ineptitude among “mom-and-pop” tax preparers and unscrupulousness among other preparers who take advantage of uninformed taxpayers. Efforts to pass the legislation in Congress, however, had stalled.

Now, Commissioner Koskinen is using the recently issued GAO report to renew the push to established minimum standards for tax preparers. It would seem unlikely, however, that these new efforts will bear any fruit.

Update on APA Challenges to Notice of Deficiency

by Jeffrey M. Glassman and McDermott Will & Schulte | Apr 21, 2016 | Appellate Courts, Court Procedure Matters, Uncategorized

In an earlier blog post, we discussed the US Tax Court’s ruling in QinetiQ U.S. Holdings, Inc. v. Commissioner, No. 14122-13 (Dec. 27, 2013). The taxpayer had argued that the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS’) notice of deficiency containing a one-sentence reason for the deficiency determination violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because it was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” The Tax Court disagreed, emphasizing that it was well settled that the court is not subject to the APA. To refresh, the APA provides a general rule that a reviewing court that is subject to the APA must hold unlawful and set aside an agency action unwarranted by the facts to the extent the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court. (more…)

Supreme Court Denies Review in Highly Contested Foreign Tax Credit Case

by Damon M. Lyon and McDermott Will & Schulte | Apr 19, 2016 | Appellate Courts, Tax Refunds, Trial Courts, Uncategorized

On April 18, 2016, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the foreign tax credit dispute involving Albemarle Corp. We have previously written about the case here, here, and here, which involved the timeliness of claims for refund pursuant to Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section 6511(d)(3)(A)’s 10-year limitations period.

Generally, a taxpayer must file a claim for refund within the later of three years from the time the original return was filed, or two years from the time the tax was paid. Congress extended this period for refund claims related to foreign tax credits (FTC). IRC section 6511(d)(3)(A) extends the refund limitation period to “10 years from the date prescribed by law for filing the return for the year in which such taxes were actually paid or accrued.” Before IRC section 6511(d)(3)(A) was amended in 1997, the statute required that refund claims be made within 10 years from the date prescribed by law for filing the return for the year with respect to which the claim was made.

In the Albemarle case, the taxpayer filed refund claims related to foreign taxes paid that were more than 10 years after the date the tax returns for the years were due, without extension. The taxpayer argued that the plain language of the statute permitted it to file a claim for refund within 10 years from the date the payment was in fact (actually) made, which was less than 10 years before the claims were filed. Both the US Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit disagreed, with the latter holding that the term “actually … accrued” is ambiguous and that Congress intended that the relevant period commenced on the due date of the original returns.

Taxpayers with a similar fact pattern to Albemarle, and who desire to dispute the holding in that case, will want to file suit in local district court to avoid the negative precedent and hope that a court not bound by the Federal Circuit will reach a different decision. Taxpayers may also want to consider filing protective refund claims in situations where it does not appear that a tax payment to a foreign jurisdiction will actually be made (and there will be enough time to file a formal refund claim with the IRS) within 10 years from the date the US federal income tax return was filed to avoid the situation in Albemarle.

3M Company, IRS File Opening Briefs in “Blocked Income” Case

by Roger J. Jones | Apr 18, 2016 | Appellate Courts, Transfer Pricing Resource, Trial Courts, Uncategorized

As noted in an earlier post, 3M Co. v. Commissioner, T.C. Dkt. No. 5816-13, involves 3M’s challenge to the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS’s) determination that Brazilian legal restrictions on the payment of royalties from a subsidiary in that country to its US parent should not be taken into account in determining the arm’s-length royalty between 3M and its subsidiary under Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(h)(2). The case has been submitted fully stipulated under Tax Court Rule 122, and the parties’ simultaneous opening briefs were filed on March 21, 2016.

Citing First Sec. Bank of Utah and cases following it, 3M first argues that “[c]ase law consistently holds that the Commissioner cannot employ section 482 to allocate income that the taxpayer has not received and cannot receive because a law prevents its payment or receipt.” Under this line of authority the IRS’s proposed allocation of royalty income to 3M is precluded by Brazilian law. This result is not changed by Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(h)(2) because that regulation is invalid.

The regulation is “procedurally invalid,” 3M argues, because Treasury and the IRS failed to satisfy the requirements of § 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) when they promulgated the regulation. They did not respond to significant comments criticizing the proposed regulation; nor did they articulate a satisfactory justification or explanation for the regulation. They thus did not engage in the “reasoned decisionmaking” required by the APA and case law such as State Farm and Altera when an agency issues regulations. (more…)

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