Trial Courts Archives | Page 23 of 39

Trial Courts

Update on Deference to IRS Positions

by Jonathan D. Lockhart, Jeffrey M. Glassman and McDermott Will & Emery | Apr 20, 2016 | Court Procedure Matters, IRS Guidance, Trial Courts, Uncategorized

As we discussed here, and in our recent article in The Federal Lawyer, deference to Internal Revenue Service (IRS) pronouncement is an important issue for taxpayers and their advisors. Our prior writings dealt generally with the three levels of deference in tax cases and how they have been applied by the courts. A recent Tax Court case looks at the level of deference owed to statements in preambles to tax regulations.

In Estate of Morrissette v. Commissioner, 146 T.C. No. 11 (Apr. 13, 2016), the taxpayer cited to the preamble to regulations dealing with split-dollar life insurance arrangements. Those regulations dealt with two mutually exclusive regimes for taxing these types of arrangements entered into after September 17, 2013. The preamble to the regulations included an example that was structurally identical to the arrangements at issue in the Tax Court case. In reviewing the preamble, the court noted that while it had previously been unpersuaded by a preamble, it believed that the preamble was a statement of the IRS’s interpretation of the statute and therefore should be judged under the “power to persuade” standard in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 US 134, 140 (1944). The Tax Court found that the preamble was consistent with the taxpayer’s interpretation of the statute and contrary to the IRS’s position, and found the logic of the preamble to be sound.

The Tax Court’s statements regarding Skidmore deference are important for taxpayers, both in planning and defending transactions. In prior cases, the Tax Court has held that the IRS is “obligated to follow” its “published administrative position” and treated such positions as a concession as to the proper result, e.g., Dixon v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. 173, 188 (2013). A preamble to a regulation could be viewed as a published administrative position, given that it is part of a Treasury Decision that is published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin and the IRS’s position is that the Internal Revenue Bulletin is the “authoritative instrument of the Commissioner.” Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d). It is unclear whether the taxpayer in Estate of Morrissette argued that the IRS was obligated to follow the preamble.

Taxpayers that wish to rely on preambles to regulations, or that are defending against an IRS position based on a preamble, need to be aware of these arguments in planning and defending their transactions. To the extent the preamble is supportive of a position and contains a persuasive and sound analysis, one could argue that Skidmore deference applies. Under this argument, the IRS should not be able to disavow its interpretation of a statute or regulation. Additionally, taxpayers may wish to argue that under the principle announced in Dixon and prior Tax Court cases, the statements in a preamble constitute a concession by the IRS to which it is bound. A similar analysis should be undertaken if the preamble is contrary to the taxpayer’s position.

Senate Finance Committee Approves Tax Court Nominees Copeland and Stoll

by Kristina Novak and McDermott Will & Emery | Apr 19, 2016 | Court Procedure Matters, Trial Courts, Uncategorized

Senate Finance Committee Ranking Member Ron Wyden (D-Oregon) issued an April 18, 2016 statement noting the committee’s approval of Tax Court nominees Elizabeth Copeland and Vik Stoll. In 2015, President Obama nominated Copeland and Stoll to be judges at the US Tax Court.

Copeland is a partner at the law firm Strasburger & Price, LLP. If confirmed, she will be assuming the position left vacant by the 2014 retirement of Judge Diane L. Kroupa.

Stoll is Deputy Chief Administrative Officer and Director of Collections for Jackson County, Missouri. If confirmed, he will be assuming the position left vacant by Judge James S. Halpern, who took senior status in late 2015.

Supreme Court Denies Review in Highly Contested Foreign Tax Credit Case

by Damon M. Lyon and McDermott Will & Emery | Apr 19, 2016 | Appellate Courts, Tax Refunds, Trial Courts, Uncategorized

On April 18, 2016, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the foreign tax credit dispute involving Albemarle Corp. We have previously written about the case here, here, and here, which involved the timeliness of claims for refund pursuant to Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section 6511(d)(3)(A)’s 10-year limitations period.

Generally, a taxpayer must file a claim for refund within the later of three years from the time the original return was filed, or two years from the time the tax was paid. Congress extended this period for refund claims related to foreign tax credits (FTC). IRC section 6511(d)(3)(A) extends the refund limitation period to “10 years from the date prescribed by law for filing the return for the year in which such taxes were actually paid or accrued.” Before IRC section 6511(d)(3)(A) was amended in 1997, the statute required that refund claims be made within 10 years from the date prescribed by law for filing the return for the year with respect to which the claim was made.

In the Albemarle case, the taxpayer filed refund claims related to foreign taxes paid that were more than 10 years after the date the tax returns for the years were due, without extension. The taxpayer argued that the plain language of the statute permitted it to file a claim for refund within 10 years from the date the payment was in fact (actually) made, which was less than 10 years before the claims were filed. Both the US Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit disagreed, with the latter holding that the term “actually … accrued” is ambiguous and that Congress intended that the relevant period commenced on the due date of the original returns.

Taxpayers with a similar fact pattern to Albemarle, and who desire to dispute the holding in that case, will want to file suit in local district court to avoid the negative precedent and hope that a court not bound by the Federal Circuit will reach a different decision. Taxpayers may also want to consider filing protective refund claims in situations where it does not appear that a tax payment to a foreign jurisdiction will actually be made (and there will be enough time to file a formal refund claim with the IRS) within 10 years from the date the US federal income tax return was filed to avoid the situation in Albemarle.

3M Company, IRS File Opening Briefs in “Blocked Income” Case

by Roger J. Jones | Apr 18, 2016 | Appellate Courts, Transfer Pricing Resource, Trial Courts, Uncategorized

As noted in an earlier post, 3M Co. v. Commissioner, T.C. Dkt. No. 5816-13, involves 3M’s challenge to the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS’s) determination that Brazilian legal restrictions on the payment of royalties from a subsidiary in that country to its US parent should not be taken into account in determining the arm’s-length royalty between 3M and its subsidiary under Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(h)(2). The case has been submitted fully stipulated under Tax Court Rule 122, and the parties’ simultaneous opening briefs were filed on March 21, 2016.

Citing First Sec. Bank of Utah and cases following it, 3M first argues that “[c]ase law consistently holds that the Commissioner cannot employ section 482 to allocate income that the taxpayer has not received and cannot receive because a law prevents its payment or receipt.” Under this line of authority the IRS’s proposed allocation of royalty income to 3M is precluded by Brazilian law. This result is not changed by Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(h)(2) because that regulation is invalid.

The regulation is “procedurally invalid,” 3M argues, because Treasury and the IRS failed to satisfy the requirements of § 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) when they promulgated the regulation. They did not respond to significant comments criticizing the proposed regulation; nor did they articulate a satisfactory justification or explanation for the regulation. They thus did not engage in the “reasoned decisionmaking” required by the APA and case law such as State Farm and Altera when an agency issues regulations. (more…)

Tax Court Rules Whether IRS’s Transfer Pricing Adjustments Are Arbitrary, Capricious Depends on Facts and Circumstances

by Roger J. Jones | Apr 13, 2016 | Court Procedure Matters, Transfer Pricing Resource, Trial Courts, Uncategorized

In Guidant LLC f.k.a. Guidant Corporation, and Subsidiaries, et al. v. Commissioner, 146 T.C. No. 5 (Feb. 29, 2016), the taxpayer filed a motion seeking partial summary judgment on the ground that the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS’s) transfer pricing adjustments were “arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable” as a matter of law. Judge David Laro denied the motion, ruling that “whether the Commissioner abused his discretion … depends on the facts and circumstances of a given case.” The taxpayer’s motion thus presented “a question of fact that should be resolved on the basis of the trial record.”

The case involves transfer pricing adjustments under Section 482 that increased the income of Guidant Corporation and its U.S. subsidiaries by nearly $3.5 billion. Section 482 grants the IRS broad discretion to “distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances” between or among controlled enterprises if it determines that such a re-allocation is “necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income” of any of the enterprises. A taxpayer that challenges a Section 482 adjustment has a “dual burden.” First, it must show that the IRS’s adjustments are “arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.” The taxpayer must then show that its intercompany transactions reflect arm’s-length dealing. (more…)

Ax v. Commissioner: The Tax Court Reaffirms that It Is Not Subject to the APA

by Jeffrey M. Glassman and McDermott Will & Emery | Apr 12, 2016 | Appellate Courts, Court Procedure Matters, Trial Courts, Uncategorized

On April 11, 2016, the US Tax Court issued its T.C. opinion in Ax v. Commissioner. The notice of deficiency in the case determined that certain premium payments made to a captive insurance company were not established by the taxpayer to be (1) insurance expenses and (2) paid. But this is not a run of the mill captive insurance case—at least not yet.

The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) moved for leave to amend its answer in the case to assert additionally that (1) the taxpayers’ captive insurance arrangement lacked economic substance and (2) amounts paid as premiums were neither ordinary nor necessary (and to allege facts in support of both assertions). The taxpayers opposed, citing Mayo Foundation for Med. & Educ. Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55 (2011), and arguing that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and SEC v. Chenery, 318 U.S. 80 (1943) barred the IRS from “raising new grounds to support [the IRS’s] final agency action beyond those grounds originally stated in the notice of final agency action.” The taxpayers also argued that the IRS’s new assertions constituted “new matters” that did not meet required heightened pleading standards under the Tax Court’s Rules of Practice and Procedure. Ultimately, the Tax Court sided with the IRS.

(more…)

Former Tax Court Judge Indicted for Tax Evasion

by Kevin Spencer and McDermott Will & Emery | Apr 5, 2016 | Trial Courts, Uncategorized

On April 4, 2016, the US Attorney for the District of Minnesota announced a federal grand jury indictment charging former US Tax Court Judge Diane L. Kroupa and her husband with conspiring to evade the assessment of taxes. In a multi-count indictment, both were charged with conspiracy, tax evasion, making and subscribing false tax returns and obstruction of an IRS audit. According to the indictment and documents filed in court, Kroupa and her husband fraudulently claimed personal expenses as business deductions, failed to report income from a land sale, and falsely claimed financial insolvency. They also allegedly concealed certain documents from their taxpayer preparer and an IRS agent during an audit, and caused misleading documents to be delivered to the IRS. The indictment alleges that between 2004 and 2010, Kroupa and her husband purposely understated their taxable income by approximately $1 million and the amount of tax owed by at least $400,000.

Judge Kroupa was appointed to the Tax Court in June 2003, and retired from the court in June 2014. While she was on the bench, Kroupa was very active—the Tax Court’s website indicates that she authored 234 opinions, including 31 division or “T.C.” opinions, 180 “memorandum” opinions, and 23 “summary” opinions. Some of her more notable opinions were Canal Corp., Bank of NY Mellon, BMC Software, Samueli and Eaton.

Here is a link to a press release issued by the U.S. Department of Justice: Former United States Tax Court Judge and Husband Indicted for Conspiracy to Commit Tax Evasion and Obstruction of an IRS Audit.

IRS Updates Appeals Procedures for Tax Court Cases

by Robin L. Greenhouse and McDermott Will & Emery | Mar 25, 2016 | Alternative Dispute Resolution, Court Procedure Matters, IRS Appeals, IRS Guidance, Settlements, Trial Courts, Uncategorized

On March 23, 2016, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued Rev. Proc. 2016-22, 2016-15 IRB 1, which clarifies and describes the practices for the administrative appeals process in cases docketed in the Tax Court. The stated purpose of the revenue procedure is to facilitate effective utilization of appeals and to achieve earlier development and resolution of Tax Court cases.

Previously, the procedures for the appeals process of Tax Court cases was contained in Rev. Proc. 87-24, 1987-1 C.B. 720. In October 2015, the IRS released a proposed revenue procedure updating the rules and requesting public comments. Three substantive comments were received and considered by the IRS, resulting in changes to the proposed revenue procedure. Rev. Proc. 2016-22 states that some of the suggestions that were not adopted may be addressed in other IRS guidance materials.

The general rule followed by the IRS is that all cases docketed in the Tax Court that have not previously been considered by IRS Appeals will be transferred to Appeals unless the taxpayer notifies IRS counsel that it wants to forego settlement consideration by Appeals. This rule is subject to certain exceptions, most notably if the case has been designated for litigation by the IRS. The revenue procedure also provides that “[i]n limited circumstances, a docketed case or issue will not be referred if Division Counsel or a higher level Counsel official determines that referral is not in the interest of sound tax administration.” Although no definition is provided, examples are provided of: (1) a case involving a significant issue common to other cases in litigation for which the IRS maintains a consistent position; or (2) cases related to a case over which the Department of Justice has jurisdiction. Referral to IRS Appeals will generally occur within 30 days of the case becoming at issue in the Tax Court, which can be either the date the Answer is filed by the IRS or a Reply (if required) is filed by the taxpayer.

The revenue procedure clarifies, and limits, the role of IRS counsel when a case is referred to Appeals. Unlike Rev. Proc. 87-24, the new revenue procedure provides that Appeals has sole discretion to determine whether IRS counsel may participate in any settlement conference and will consider input from the taxpayer on this point. It also clarifies that when a case is forwarded to Appeals for consideration, “Appeals has the sole authority to resolve the case through settlement until the case is returned to Counsel.” In the past, taxpayers were concerned about the ability of IRS counsel to disrupt a settlement reached with Appeals. If a settlement is reached with Appeals, IRS counsel’s involvement is ministerial in that counsel should only review any decision document signed by the taxpayer for accuracy and completeness before signing the decision document on behalf of the IRS and filing it with the Tax Court.

The new revenue procedure should also be a welcome development for estate tax cases given that there is no statutory provision to extend the [...]

Continue Reading

Tax Court Announces New Chief Judge and Special Trial Judge

by McDermott Will & Emery | Mar 25, 2016 | Trial Courts, Uncategorized

On March 24, 2016, the Tax Court announced that Diana L. Leyden has been selected as a Special Trial Judge scheduled to assume her duties in June 2016. Ms. Leyden most recently has been the Taxpayer Advocate in the New York City Department of Finance, but previously spent over 15 years as the Director of the Low Income Taxpayer Clinic at the University of Connecticut School of Law. She received the American Bar Association Tax Section Janet Spragens Pro Bono Award in 2005 for her work on behalf of low-income taxpayers. Ms. Leyden, who previously clerked at the Tax Court and spent several years in private practice, should be a welcomed addition to the bench. The Tax Court’s press release can be found here.

As previously announced by the Tax Court on February 29, 2016, Judge L. Paige Marvel will begin serving a two-year term as Chief Judge of the Tax Court beginning June 1, 2016. Judge Marvel was appointed to the Court in 1998. Prior to joining the Court, she focused on federal and state tax matters and controversies. As readers of this blog may know, Judge Marvel was the authoring Judge of the Court’s recent fully-reviewed opinion in Altera Corp. v. Commissioner, 145 T.C. No. 3 (July 27, 2015), which struck down cost-sharing regulations under the Administrative Procedure Act. The Tax Court’s press release can be found here.

IRS Loses Summary Judgment In Mylan Case

by Chelsea Hess and Kevin Spencer | Mar 16, 2016 | Court Procedure Matters, Trial Courts, Uncategorized

On March 10, 2016, Tax Court Judge Laro denied the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) motion for summary judgment in Mylan’s challenge of the IRS’s determination that approximately $372 million should be treated as ordinary income. See Mylan Inc. and Subsidiaries v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, T.C.M. 2016-45. In its Tax Court petition, Mylan seeks a redetermination of tax deficiencies related to proceeds from the sale of “all substantial rights” in a patent that Mylan treated as capital gain. The IRS recharacterized the income as ordinary income received under a sublicense of patent rights.

Mylan entered into a number of agreements, including a 2008 agreement in the form of an “exclusive license,” that Mylan contends effectuated a sale of patent rights and entitles it to capital gain treatment. In deciding the motion for summary judgment, the Tax Court considered whether the tax treatment should be determined based upon Mylan’s licensing agreements. The IRS argued that pursuant to Commissioner v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771,775 (3d Cir. 1967), taxpayers are bound by the terms of their agreements. Mylan argued that Danielson does not apply because the Third Circuit has previously examined not only the terms of the contracts but also the intent of the parties in determining whether “all substantial rights” under a patent were transferred, relying on such authorities as Merck & Co. v. Smith, 261 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1958) and E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 432 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1970).

The Tax Court, however, determined that there is no inconsistency between Danielson, Merck and E.I. du Pont:

We do not see the inconsistency here. In Danielson, a taxpayer sought to change the tax consequences of a transaction by challenging the validity of the underlying contract’s terms, specifically, allocation of consideration between the sale of stock and the covenant not to compete, because the taxpayer believed these terms did not reflect the agreement of the parties. In Merck and E.I. du Pont de Nemours the taxpayers did not seek to alter or challenge the agreements in question. Instead, the taxpayers disagreed with the Commissioner’s interpretation of those contracts and characterization of the related payments for tax purposes. Here, unlike in Danielson, petitioners do not seek to change the tax consequences of the transaction by challenging the underlying agreements and reforming the contractual terms. On the record before us, the facts here resemble those in Merck and E.I. du Pont de Nemours. The question presented here is a question of proper tax characterization of the proceeds of valid and enforceable contracts, and we are mindful that the Commissioner and taxpayers often disagree on this issue.

The Tax Court found that there are issues of material fact in dispute, and denied the IRS’s motion for summary judgment.

Now that the Tax Court has denied summary disposition of the case, the parties will litigate the capital vs. ordinary tax treatment of transfers of patents. We will report back as developments occur in this hotly contested area [...]

Continue Reading

Older Posts »

« Newer Posts

EDITOR IN CHIEF

Edward Froelich

EDITOR IN CHIEF

STAY CONNECTED

TOPICS

ARCHIVES

RECENT POSTS