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Courts Outline Boundaries of the Anti-Injunction Act Post-CIC Services

by Kevin Spencer, Sarah M. Raben and McDermott Will & Emery | Aug 23, 2022 | Appellate Courts, Court Procedure Matters, IRS Appeals, Trial Courts

Since the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in CIC Servs., LLC v. IRS was issued in May 2021, courts have grappled with how to apply the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA) in other contexts. The US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently affirmed the dismissal of a lawsuit under the AIA in Hancock County Land Acquisitions, LLC v. United States, while the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently held that the AIA does not prevent a challenge to the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) use of John Doe summons in Harper v. Rettig.

In July, we posted about a circuit split between the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits over claimed Administrative Procedure Act (APA) violations. As discussed below, these post-CIC Services decisions are shaping the boundaries of challenges based upon the APA and the AIA.

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

The taxpayer in this case reported a $180 million deduction for a conservation easement on land it owned in Mississippi. The IRS audited the taxpayer and requested an extension of the statute of limitations on assessment in Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 6501. The taxpayer initially declined, but 11 months after the request it agreed to extend the limitations period. At that point, the IRS had almost finished with its examination, and the parties never executed the extension. The IRS issued a Notice of Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (FPAA), and the taxpayer was unable to pursue an administrative resolution with the IRS Office of Independent Appeals (IRS Appeals). The taxpayer filed suit in US federal district court, arguing, among other things, that the IRS violated the APA when it did not send the case to IRS Appeals, resulting in the taxpayer being deprived of pre-litigation administrative resolution of its tax dispute. The IRS moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which the district court granted.

On appeal, the taxpayer argued that the suit was not barred by the AIA, citing CIC Services. The Eleventh Circuit, however, explained that the three considerations that led to that conclusion in CIC Services were the “same three considerations [that] lead to the opposite conclusion here.” The Court found that the taxpayer: (1) would not be subject to any costs separate and apart from the tax penalty from the FPAA; (2) was on the cusp of liability when it filed its suit and (3) would not suffer any criminal punishment by following the AIA’s “familiar pay-now-sue-later procedure.” The Court stated, “at its heart, this suit is a ‘dispute over taxes,’” and it was far from clear that under no circumstances could the IRS prevail on the merits of the taxpayer’s claim.

THE FIRST CIRCUIT

In 2013, the taxpayer in this case opened an account with a digital currency exchange. He deposited bitcoin into his account in 2013 and 2014. In 2015, he started to liquidate his Bitcoin holdings, which lasted until 2016 when his holdings were depleted. At that [...]

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Huge Win for Refined Coal: DC Appeals Court Permits Tax Credits

by Kevin Spencer and McDermott Will & Emery | Aug 16, 2022 | Appellate Courts, Court Procedure Matters, Trial Courts

On August 5, 2022, the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the US Tax Court’s bench opinion in favor of partners and investors in a refined coal business. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has consistently fought taxpayers’ attempts to claim a tax credit for refining coal despite a clear congressional mandate in Internal Revenue Code section 45(c)(7)(A). The IRS has repeatedly taken the position that the partnerships formed to utilize the tax credits generated by the refined coal business are not bona fide because the partnerships could never make an economic profit without the tax credits.

In Cross Refined Coal LLC, the IRS examined the partnership’s 2011 and 2012 tax years and disallowed $25.8 million of refined coal production tax credits and $25.7 million of claimed operating losses. The IRS argued that:

The partnership did not exist as a matter of fact.
The partnership was not, in substance, a partnership for federal income tax purposes because it was not formed to carry on a business or for the sharing of profits and losses from the production or sale of refined coal by its purported members/partners, but rather was created to facilitate the prohibited transaction of monetizing refined coal tax credits.
The transaction was entered into solely to purchase refined coal tax credits and other tax benefits.
Claimed expenses were not ordinary and necessary or credible expenses in connection with a trade or business or other activity engaged in for profit.

After a two-week trial involving several witnesses and thousands of exhibits, the Tax Court held that the partnership was legitimate because its partners made substantial contributions to the partnership, participated in its management and shared in its profits and losses. The IRS appealed to the DC Circuit.

In affirming the Tax Court, the DC Circuit held that the partners intended to form a partnership and had legitimate non-tax motives for the business. The Court diffused any concern that the partnership included tax benefits, explaining that “there was nothing untoward about seeking partners who could apply the refined-coal credits immediately, rather than carrying them forward to future tax years.” The Court also recognized that “Congress expressly provided for coal refiners to employ this investment strategy, for the tax code specifies how the credit must be divided when a refining facility has multiple owners.” The Court was not persuaded by the IRS’s concern that the partners did not enter the partnership to obtain a pre-tax profit: “[a]ccording to the Commissioner, Cross’s partners did not have the requisite intent to carry on a business together because Cross was not ‘undertaken for profit or for other legitimate nontax business purposes.’” The Court disagreed, explaining:

As a general matter, a partnership’s pursuit of after-tax profit can be legitimate business activity for partners to carry on together. This is especially true in the context of tax incentives, which exist precisely to encourage activity that would not otherwise be profitable.

The DC Circuit found [...]

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Sixth Circuit Denies Proceeds Regulation Rehearing Request, Sets Up a Circuit Split

by Sarah M. Raben and McDermott Will & Emery | Jul 13, 2022 | Appellate Courts, Court Procedure Matters, IRS Guidance, Trial Courts

The US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently denied a taxpayer’s request for a rehearing en banc in Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, No. 20-2117, leaving a highly contested conservation easement regulation in place and setting up a split between the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits.

In Oakbrook, the taxpayer argued that Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii), known as the “proceeds regulation,” was invalid because it did not satisfy the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures. The regulation addresses how to allocate proceeds between donors and donees if an easement is judicially extinguished and the property is sold. In May 2020, the US Tax Court held that the regulation was “procedurally and substantively valid” under the APA. The Sixth Circuit agreed with the Tax Court, upholding the regulation.

The Sixth Circuit’s order issued July 6, 2022, indicated that neither the judges on the original panel nor any other judge on the full court requested a vote for a suggested rehearing. Last year, however, the Eleventh Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Hewitt v. Commissioner, finding that the same regulation was invalid because it violated the APA. Thus, there is a clear circuit split on the issue.

Practice Point: The government did not seek a review of the Hewitt decision from the Supreme Court of the United States, so that ruling stands in the Eleventh Circuit. It remains to be seen whether the taxpayer in Oakbrook files a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. With a split between the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, it is possible this conservation easement battle could be headed to the Supreme Court to determine the fate of the proceeds regulation.

Late CDP Petitions May Still Be Entitled to Tax Court Review

by Sarah M. Raben and McDermott Will & Emery | Apr 22, 2022 | Appellate Courts, Court Procedure Matters, IRS Appeals, Trial Courts

In a unanimous decision in Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner issued on April 21, 2022, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit’s ruling (which affirmed the US Tax Court) and held that the 30-day time limit to file a petition with the Tax Court in a collection due process (CDP) case is a non-jurisdictional deadline subject to equitable tolling. The Supreme Court remanded the case to determine whether the taxpayer is entitled to equitable tolling.

The one-day-late showdown started in 2015, when the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) notified Boechler, P.C. (Boechler), a North Dakota law firm, of a tax discrepancy. Boechler did not respond, which triggered the assessment of an “intentional disregard” penalty along with a notice that the IRS intended to seize Boechler’s property to satisfy the penalty. Boechler requested a CDP hearing before the IRS Independent Office of Appeals (IRS Appeals), arguing that: (1) there was no discrepancy in its tax filings and (2) the penalty was excessive. IRS Appeals rejected these arguments and sustained the proposed levy. Boechler then had 30 days to file its Tax Court petition but missed the deadline by one day. The Tax Court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the 30-day filing deadline is jurisdictional and cannot be equitably tolled. The Eighth Circuit affirmed.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari. The US government argued that the deadline was jurisdictional and the Tax Court lacks the power to accept a tardy filing by applying the doctrine of equitable tolling. Boechler argued that equitable tolling applied, and the Tax Court had jurisdiction over its case. The Supreme Court, continuing a trend of distinguishing between claim processing rules and jurisdictional rules, agreed with Boechler.

Internal Revenue Code (Code) Section 6330(d)(1) states, “[t]he person may, within 30 days of a determination under this section, petition the Tax Court for review of such determination (and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction with respect to such matter).” The Supreme Court explained that a procedural requirement is treated as jurisdictional “only if Congress ‘clearly states’ that it is” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 515 (2006), although US Congress need not “incant magic words.” Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center, 568 U. S. 145, 153 (2013).

The Supreme Court clarified that the question was whether the statutory language limits the Tax Court’s jurisdiction to petitions filed within that timeframe. That answer turned on the meaning of the phrase “such matters.” The first independent clause explains what a taxpayer may do, (“The person may, within 30 days of a determination under this section, petition the Tax Court for review of such determination.”) However, the phrase “such matters” does not clearly mandate the jurisdictional reading and lacks clear antecedent. In addition, the Supreme Court also explained that Code Section 6330(d)(1) lacked in comparable clarity as to other tax provisions enacted around the same time. Finally, the Supreme [...]

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An Update on Section 6751 Penalties

by Kevin Spencer and McDermott Will & Emery | Mar 23, 2022 | Appellate Courts, Court Procedure Matters, IRS Appeals, IRS Audits, IRS Guidance, Trial Courts

Tax penalties are always a hot topic here. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has a large arsenal when it comes to grounds for asserting penalties on income tax deficiencies, ranging from the common 20% penalty under Internal Revenue Code (Code) Section 6662(a) to higher penalties ranging from 40% (gross valuation or basis misstatements and economic substance) to 75% (fraud).

However, before the IRS can assert most penalties against taxpayers, it must comply with the procedural requirement in Code Section 6751(b): That the “initial determination” to assert the penalty be “personally approved (in writing) by the immediate supervisor of the individual making such determination.” As the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit explained in Chai v. Commissioner, US Congress imposed this requirement because it “believes that penalties should only be imposed where appropriate and not as a bargaining chip” and “[t]he statute was meant to prevent IRS agents from threatening unjustified penalties to encourage taxpayers to settle.”

Over the past several years, there has been substantial litigation over the proper interpretation and application of Code Section 6751(b). The US Tax Court’s recent opinion in Oxbow Bend, LLC v. Commissioner is the latest development. In Oxbow Bend, the Tax Court rejected the taxpayer’s position that the “initial determination” was made on the date that the examining agent prepared a penalty lead sheet reflecting her recommendation to assert penalties and stated in a telephone conference with the taxpayer’s representative on that same day that penalties were being considered. Approximately three months later, the examining agent’s supervisor approved the penalty lead sheet, and the IRS issued a Notice of Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment asserting the penalties. The Tax Court, relying on its prior precedent, held that the word “determination”:

“has an established meaning in the tax context and denotes a communication with a high degree of concreteness and formality”
“signifies a consequential moment of IRS action”
is not a “mere suggestion, proposal, or initial informal mention of penalties”
“will be embodied in a formal written communication that notifies the taxpayer of the decision to assert penalties.”

Thus, under the Tax Court’s analysis, an “initial determination” can only be made in a “written” document that is provided to the taxpayer.

Oxbow Bend is a memorandum opinion of the Tax Court and, therefore, is limited to its facts and technically not precedential, as we have discussed in the past. However, memorandum opinions are often cited by litigants, and the Tax Court does not disregard these types of opinions lightly. One has to wonder whether, under different facts where an examining agent makes an explicit oral statement to a taxpayer that penalties “will” be asserted, courts might reach a different result given Congress’s express intent that examining agents should not threaten penalties and use them as a bargaining chip for settlement purposes. Further, Code Section 6751(b) expressly requires that the supervisory approval be “in writing” but contains a written requirement for purposes of the [...]

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IRS Announces Nonacquiescence in Mayo Tax Regulation Invalidity Holding

by Kevin Spencer and McDermott Will & Emery | Nov 22, 2021 | Appellate Courts, Court Procedure Matters, IRS Guidance, Tax Reform, Trial Courts

We previously wrote here and here about decisions made by the District Court of Minnesota and the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Mayo Clinic v. United States regarding challenges to the validity of certain Treasury Regulations promulgated under Internal Revenue Code (Code) Section 170. In that case, the Eighth Circuit held for the taxpayer in part and the government in part and remanded to the district court to further develop the record and address certain issues.

The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) recently announced in an Action on Decision (AOD) that it will not acquiesce in the Eighth Circuit’s holding, which invalidated Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(c)(1)’s requirement that the primary function of an education organization described in Code Section 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) must be the presentation of formal instruction. This means that in all cases not appealable to the Eighth Circuit, the IRS will not follow this holding and will continue to litigate the issue.

The IRS’s policy is to announce at an early date whether it will follow the holdings in certain cases, and it does so by making an announcement in an AOD. A nonacquiescence is not binding on courts or the taxpayers but merely signals the IRS’s position that it disagrees with a court decision. (Sometimes the IRS will acquiesce in a decision.) Given that an AOD is published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin, it could be argued that the IRS’s action constitutes published guidance taxpayers can rely on. The IRS’s list of AODs, with links to each action, can be found here.

Supreme Court Grants Certiorari in One Tax Case, Denies it in Several Others

by Kevin Spencer and McDermott Will & Emery | Oct 6, 2021 | Appellate Courts, Court Procedure Matters, Trial Courts

Historically, the Supreme Court of the United States rarely grants petitions for certiorari in tax cases, and it appears this trend continues in the current term.

On September 30, 2021, the Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari in Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner. The case presents the question of whether Internal Revenue Code Section 6330(d)(1), which establishes a 30-day time limit for filing a petition in the US Tax Court to review a notice of determination by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in a collection due process matter, is a jurisdictional requirement or a claim-processing rule subject to the equitable tolling doctrine.

On October 4, 2021, the Supreme Court denied petitions for certiorari in Healthcare Distribution Alliance v. James and Taylor Lohmeyer Law Firm PLLC v. United States. The former involved a challenge to a US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decision that held that an opioid stewardship surcharge was a tax within the meaning of the Tax Injunction Act. The Court also found that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to rule on the challenge to the payment. The latter case involved a law firm’s challenge to the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s decision that the IRS could use a “John Doe” summons to seek the identifies of taxpayers who it believed may have taken the firm’s advice to hide income offshore.

The Supreme Court also denied petitions for certiorari in the following cases:

Perkins v. Commissioner: A case regarding the taxability of income derived from the sale of land and gravel mined from treaty-protected land by an enrolled member of the Seneca Nation
Kimble v. United States: A case focused on Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts penalties and
Razzouk v. United States: A case involving restitution for tax and bribery convictions

Still pending are petitions in Willis v. United States (which involves the value of collectible coins seized by the government and deposited into an IRS account) and Clay v. Commissioner (which deals with a dispute over whether to follow guidance from the Bureau of Indian Affairs or the IRS).

Practice Point: Although the Supreme Court rarely reviews tax cases, when it does, the decision is usually important because it’s applicable to numerous taxpayers. For example, cases such as Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States and United States v. Home Concrete & Supply LLC both provided significant guidance for taxpayers regarding the IRS’s scope of regulatory authority. Additionally, non-tax cases from the Supreme Court can contain general principles that are also applicable and impact tax positions taken, or being considered, by taxpayers. Thus, it is important that taxpayers and their representatives stay abreast on what is happening at the Supreme Court.

Ninth Circuit Holds Tax Form is Substance

by Kevin Spencer and McDermott Will & Emery | Jun 4, 2021 | Appellate Courts, Court Procedure Matters, Trial Courts

The substance over form doctrine (and related step transaction and economic substance doctrines) are often invoked by courts to disallow tax consequences that seem too good to be true. Courts have struggled for years with how to properly apply these doctrines. Those advocating against application usually rely on the famous passage by Judge Learned Hand in Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934): “Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one’s taxes.” Those advocating for this position seek shelter in cases like Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945), in which the Supreme Court of the United States stated, “the incidence of taxation depends upon the substance of a transaction. …. To permit the true nature of a transaction to be disguised by mere formalisms, which exist solely to alter tax liabilities, would seriously impair the effective administration of the tax policies of Congress.” But ultimately, as the Supreme Court explained in Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935), “the question for determination is whether what was done, apart from the tax motive, was the thing which the statute intended.”

However, what the statute intended is not always easy to determine. In Mazzei v. Commissioner, No. 18-82451 (9th Cir. June 2, 2021), the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit answered this question in the context of tax motivated transactions involving the since-repealed foreign service corporation (FSC) regime that was complied with all the formalities required by the Internal Revenue Code but which the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) asserted should nonetheless be recharacterized under the substance over form doctrine. The Court noted it is a “black-letter principle” and courts follow “substance over form” in construing and applying the tax laws. However, this doctrine is not a “smell test” but rather a tool of statutory construction that must be applied based on the statutory framework at issue. Thus, in appropriate situations where Congress indicates that form should control, the substance over form doctrine is abrogated.

That is exactly what happened in Mazzei. Agreeing with the First, Second and Sixth Circuits, which had previously addressed similar issues, the Ninth Circuit found that the statutory framework and history indicated that Congress did not intend for the substance over form doctrine to apply to the FSC regime. While “[i]t may have been unwise for Congress to allow taxpayers to pay reduced taxes” under the statutory scheme, “it is not our role to save the [IRS] from the inescapable logical consequence of what Congress has plainly authorized.”

Practice Point: The distinction between tax avoidance (permissible) and tax avoidance (impermissible) is not always an obvious line. Taxpayers should be able to rely on the words used by Congress when enacting tax laws, but courts [...]

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Tax Court Holds IRS Chief Counsel Attorneys May Make Initial Penalty Determination

by Kevin Spencer, Brian Moore and McDermott Will & Emery | Jun 8, 2020 | Appellate Courts, IRS Appeals, IRS Guidance

In general, section 6751 requires that a supervisor give written approval before penalties can be asserted against a taxpayer. In Koh v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-77, authored by the US Tax Court’s (Tax Court) most recent addition—Judge Travis Greaves—the Tax Court affirmed that an attorney from Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Chief Counsel may be authorized to assert such penalties in an answer to a Tax Court petition.

In Koh, the IRS sent the taxpayer a notice of deficiency that included a determination related to penalties under section 6662(j). The taxpayer filed a petition with the Tax Court contesting the IRS’s determination. In its answer, the IRS Chief Counsel attorney asserted that the taxpayer was liable for accuracy-related penalties under section 6662(b)(1) or (2), in the alternative to the section 6662(j) penalties assessed in the original deficiency notice.

The taxpayer sought partial judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that IRS Chief Counsel attorneys are not authorized to assert penalties in the answer. Under section 6751(b)(1), a penalty may not be assessed unless the “the initial determination of such assessment” was “personally approved (in writing) by the immediate supervisor of the individual making such determination.”

The Tax Court reasoned that as the IRS’s representative, the Chief Counsel attorney (or a delegate) may assert additional penalties in an answer to a Tax Court petition. Moreover, the Tax Court ruled that Chief Counsel attorneys had authority to assert penalties in an answer in Roth v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2017-248, aff’d, 922 F.3d 1126 (10th Cir. 2019). That opinion was based on numerous cases holding that the IRS may assert penalties in an answer. However, Roth pre-dated the Tax Court’s opinion in Clay v. Commissioner, 152 T.C. 223 (2019), which cited US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit authority for the proposition that “written approval is required no later than the issuance of the notice of deficiency rather than the assessment of the tax.”

Practice Point: Taxpayers continue to face risk from penalties being asserted for the first time in an answer in a Tax Court Proceeding. We believe that there is a strong likelihood that Koh will be appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. We will continue to follow new developments related to penalties and the supervisory approval requirement.

Alta Wind: Federal Circuit Reverses Trial Court and Kicks Case Back to Answer Primary Issue

by Kevin Spencer and Philip Tingle | Aug 6, 2018 | Appellate Courts, Court Procedure Matters, Transfer Pricing Resource, Trial Courts, Uncategorized

On July 27, 2018, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Alta Wind v. United States, reversed and remanded what had been a resounding victory for renewable energy. The US Court of Federal Claims had ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to claim a Section 1603 cash grant on the total amount paid for wind energy assets, including the value of certain power purchase agreements (PPAs).

We have reported on the Alta Wind case several times in the past two years:

Government Appeal of Alta Wind Supports Decision to File Suit Now

Court Awards $206 Million to Alta Wind Projects in Section 1603 Grant Litigation; Smaller Award to Biomass Facility

Act Now To Preserve Your Section 1603 Grant

SOL and the 1603 Cash Grant – File Now or Forever Hold Your Peace

In reversing the trial court, the appellate court failed to answer the substantive question of whether a PPA that is part of the sale of a renewable energy facility is creditable for purposes of the Section 1603 cash grant.

Trial Court Decision

The Court of Federal Claims awarded the plaintiff damages of more than $206 million with respect to the cash grant under Section 1603 of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (the Section 1603 Grant). The court held that the government had underpaid the plaintiff its Section 1603 Grants arising from the development and purchase of large wind facilities when it refused to include the value of certain PPAs in the plaintiffs’ eligible basis for the cash grants. The trial court rejected the government’s argument that the plaintiffs’ basis was limited solely to development and construction costs. Instead, the court agreed with the plaintiffs that the arm’s-length purchase price of the projects prior to their placed-in-service date informed the projects’ creditable value. The court also determined that the PPAs specific to the wind facilities should not be treated as ineligible intangible property for purposes of the Section 1603 Grant. This meant that any value associated with the PPAs would be creditable for purposes of the Section 1603 Grant.

Federal Circuit Reverses and Remands

The government appealed its loss to the Federal Circuit. In its opinion, the Federal Circuit reversed the trial court’s decision, and remanded the case back to the trial court with instructions. The Federal Circuit held that the purchase of the wind facilities should be properly treated as “applicable asset acquisitions” for purposes of Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section 1060, and the purchase prices must be allocated using the so-called “residual method.” The residual method requires a taxpayer to allocate the purchase price among seven categories. The purpose of the allocation is to discern what amount of a purchase price should be ascribed to each category of assets, which may have significance for other parts of the IRC. For example, if the purchase price includes depreciable [...]

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